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Abstract
This Comment explores the conflict between state-described freedom of expression and the
autonomy of social media companies to regulate content on their platforms through the lens of the
Network Enforcement Act, passed by Germany in 2017, and the freedom of expression clause
of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Network Enforcement Act, which compels
social media companies to monitor and remove content from their sites which violate certain other
provisions of German law, has thrust the issues of intermediary autonomy and censorship-byproxy into the spotlight. Proponents of the law support it as a way to ensure that what is illegal
offline remains illegal online. Opponents argue that the law essentially amounts to censorship,
and therefore violates freedom of expression under the German constitution and a host of
international treaties. This Comment finds that while the law likely does not violate freedom of
expression as enumerated under Article 5 of the Basic Laws of the Republic of Germany, it may
violate freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights,
in part because the law incentivizes “overblocking” which could lead to the removal of lawful
speech without due process. In order to promulgate such regulations, more than one country needs
to band together in order to promote safety and international security without curtailing civil
rights.
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helping me develop this Comment from a casual question of “is this legal” to a thesis about the
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team at Cloudflare, who introduced me to the idea that international law touches more than just
trade and migration. This is a piece I am really proud of, and I hope everyone who helped me work
on it understands exactly how important their role was.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
In January 2018, Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in
sozialen Netzwerken 1 (hereinafter the Network Enforcement Act) came into
effect. 2 Passed in late 2017 by the Bundestag, the German federal parliament, the
Network Enforcement Act was designed to combat hate speech, radicalization,
and fake news online. 3 The crux of the law provides that when a social media
company receives a complaint about a piece of controversial content, if that
company has more than two million German users 4 it must spring into action to
determine whether the content is “manifestly unlawful” according to eighteen
separate provisions of German criminal law. 5 If the company determines that the
content is unlawful, access to it must be removed within twenty-four hours. 6 For
borderline cases, companies have seven days to remove the content. 7 The
consequences for noncompliance are fines of up to five million euros (5.8 million
dollars in December 2018). 8 There are currently no consequences for overpolicing speech and no mechanism to contest violations.
Since the law went into effect in January 2018, it has faced a bevy of
complaints. This Comment focuses on one—whether the law violates the
freedom of expression clause, Article 10, of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). 9 Although Heiko Maas, Germany’s current Minister of Foreign
Affairs who helped introduce the bill, argued that the kind of content which the
bill seeks to have removed “damages . . . our culture of debate, and ultimately
freedom of expression,” 10 many, including Facebook, claim that the law does the
1

2

3

4
5
6
7
8

Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [Network Enforcement
Act], Sept. 1, 2017, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBL I] at 3352 (Ger.).
Official English translation may be found here: http://perma.cc/72JK-3KNM.
The law is also referred to by its abbreviated German names, NetzDG or
Netzkdurchsetzungsgesetz.
Philip Oltermann & Thomas Furmann, Tough New German Law puts Tech Firms and Free Speech in
Spotlight, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2018), http://perma.cc/ENU5-4FKZ.
Stefan Engels, Network Enforcement Act in a Nutshell, DLA PIPER BLOG: IPT GERMANY (Jan. 31,
2018), http://perma.cc/E6QT-VSEL.
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, supra note 1, at §1(2).
Id. at § 1(3).
Id. at § 3(2)(2).
Id. at § 3(2)(3).
Id. at § 4(2).

9

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 10.

10

DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: PLENARPROTOKOLL 18/235 at 23848, (statement of Heiko Maas,
Bundesminister BMJV), http://perma.cc/WKU4-HSGJ (Ger.).
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opposite and violates freedom of expression under not only the German
constitution but a host of international treaties. 11
Because of the punitive nature of the fines, social media companies are
incentivized to err on the side of caution and remove any content that is reported.
This includes unlawful content, but also clearly satirical tweets parodying actual
illegal content 12 and heated, but ultimately harmless, 13 comments. 14
Facebook has allegedly recruited “several hundred staff” to deal with
complaints. 15 For some, such as Bernhard Rohleder, CEO of Bitkom, a digital
industry association which represents more than 2,600 German tech companies, 16
it appears as though Germany is privatizing the administration of justice and
outsourcing it to large U.S. companies. 17 On the other hand, the rise of “fake
news” and the use of social media by foreign actors to influence people’s thoughts
and ideas are increasingly large national security and safety concerns. 18
To say that the law is controversial is an understatement. However, whether
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) would find that it in fact violates
freedom of expression is another story. While the law, and the way the lower
courts are currently enforcing it, may harm individual freedom of expression, the
legitimate national security and safety concerns could allow for the law to be
upheld without further adjustments. This would alter the way these claims get
handled. That is, rather than the government or another complaining individual
having to bring their case to the courts to remove speech, the affected individuals
11

12

13

14

15

Linda Kinstler, Can Germany Fix Facebook?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2017), http://perma.cc/B7EFUDS8.
Emma Thomasson, Germany Looks to Revise Social Media Law as Europe Watches, REUTERS (Mar. 8,
2018), http://perma.cc/ZM6T-76XU (explaining that Titanic, a satirical magazine, had its content
removed for parodying the language of a tweet from a far-right German political party which was
also removed).
“Harmless” varies from person to person. There are a number of online posts, some of which will
be discussed in this Comment, which cause real emotional harm to users. However, harmless is
used here to mean not tending to call for or incite immediate violence or threatening physical harm
against a given user.
Christof Kerkmann, German Court Overturns Facebook ‘Censorship,’ HANDELSBLATT TODAY (Apr. 13,
2018), http://perma.cc/S4LZ-DRCE (including examples of comments, such as “the Germans are
becoming more and more stupid. No wonder, as they are being clobbered daily by left-wing media
with fake news about skilled workers, declining unemployment or Trump.”).
Germany Starts Enforcing Hate Speech Law, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2018), http://perma.cc/23QB-MXB7.

16

Bitkom is the German Association for IT, Telecommunications, and New Media. For more
information see http://perma.cc/T56F-EGUT.

17

Guy Chazan, Berlin Forced to Defend Hate Speech Law, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018),
http://perma.cc/8GAN-72TF.

18

See generally Jarred Prier, Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare, 11 STRATEGIC STUD.
Q. 50 (2017).
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will have to bring their cases to court to get their accounts and posts reinstated.
This could create a severe enough chilling effect on speech to warrant the ECtHR
overturning at least part of the law. However, as this Comment explains, it is
debatable that the Network Enforcement Act is uniquely to blame for this issue,
and it is unclear whether removing the law will solve these free expression claims.
Section II addresses the history of the Network Enforcement Act. Although
current discourse relating to controlling online speech has been centered on fake
news in the wake of the U.S. 2016 election, the passage of the Network
Enforcement Act is the culmination of a decade of growing tension in Europe
between lawmakers and social media companies as both attempt to combat
terrorism. It also explains how the “Brussels Effect” 19 could now be applied to
Germany’s new law, and therefore why the ECtHR would be the proper body to
adjudicate this issue.
Section III briefly examines the history of the ECHR’s Article 10 and the
role of freedom of expression in Europe. The ECHR’s ratification in the shadow
of World War II means that its goals are centered in a historical moment that is
very different from one that the mostly U.S.-based social media companies are
accustomed to. This means that, although the Network Enforcement Act’s goals
instinctually seem to violate the traditional definition of freedom of expression
that many of the affected social media companies operate under, it is not
necessarily antithetical to the historical goals of the treaty.
In Section IV, this Comment determines whether the Network Enforcement
Act indeed violates freedom of expression under Article 10. Because the state has
a positive obligation to not interfere with freedom of expression, and penalties are
generally considered interferences, Article 10 is implicated. Despite the fact that
the goals which the legislature is attempting to promote through its interference
are rational, and the fact that the law is potentially necessary, the lack of oversight
and disproportionate fines mean that the ECtHR should find that the law violates
Article 10. However, this Comment concludes that some sort of regulation over
social media companies is necessary on an international scale in order to maintain
a unified digital environment. Finding the correct balance between maintaining
freedom of expression and promoting other rights, such as the right to privacy or
national security, is increasingly crucial and difficult as expression moves away
from public, government-sponsored forums to private locations.

II. H ISTORICAL B ACKGROUND
In order to understand the Network Enforcement Act’s interaction with free
expression rights, it is necessary to examine the law itself, as well as the forces that
19

The Brussels Effect is the term coined to describe the E.U.’s growing ability to control and affect
international regulations without entering into formal international agreements. For more
information see Section II(C).
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led to its passage. As Section II(A) discusses, the Network Enforcement Act must
be understood in the context of the recent intensification of xenophobia in
Europe, as well as the advent of terrorist attacks—coordinated online—in major
European cities. Yet, lawmakers’ attempts to curtail this unlawful speech are
arguably harming the free expression rights of their citizens when it goes beyond
standard national security justifications. In Section II(B), this Comment examines
what the Network Enforcement Act actually does. The law acknowledges that by
the time a given piece of media makes its way through the court system, it may be
too late. The effects of harmful speech or images can multiply in seconds because
of the internet. By moving the adjudication process from the courts to social
media companies and speeding up the timeline, lawmakers are responding to real
problems with monitoring online content, but in a way that arguably causes more
harm.
Indeed, as Section II(C) discusses, because of the way the Network
Enforcement Act is being interpreted, the German Bundestag is arguably
expanding domestic laws far outside Germany’s borders. Because the internet has
no boundaries when German courts ask for content to be “removed” they can,
and have, asked companies to remove it anywhere a German citizen might view
it. With current technology, this means that German law is superseding
international law and infringing on other countries’ citizens’ rights. Thus, although
this is a German law, the ECtHR should adjudicate it.

A. What Forces Led to the Network Enforcement Act’s
Passage?
In order to analyze the freedom of expression concerns, it is important to
understand the context of the Network Enforcement Act. Discussed in more
detail in Section IV, one defense to a violation of freedom of expression is a
compelling state interest. Here, Germany has frequently asserted an interest in
national security, namely blocking terrorist and extremist content on the internet.
While the Network Enforcement Act feels like a law rooted in fears about
populism and foreign election tampering, in many ways the worries that led to the
act’s passage came to a head in the wake of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in
Paris. On January 7, 2015, twelve people, including four cartoonists, were
murdered because of the magazine’s publication of a satirical “Prophet
Mohammed” cartoon. 20 The attack, which demonstrated terrorism’s global reach

20

Agnes Callamard, Religion, Terrorism, and Speech in a ‘Post-Charlie Hebdo’ World, 10 RELIG. & HUM. RTS.
207 (2015).
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in the middle of one of the most prominent cultural centers of Europe 21, became
a two-fold attack on freedom of expression. First, journalists were murdered due
to their reporting. Second, the attack ignited a push towards more stringent
policies for removing content on social media sites, such as Facebook and
YouTube.
March 2016 brought another terrorist attack, this time in Brussels, a city
known to be the center of privacy regulation in Europe. 22 In response, European
leaders made a fervent call for a code of conduct against online hate speech. 23 In
mid-2016, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube voluntarily signed the
“Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online” propagated by the
European Commission. 24 Under this code, these tech companies were tasked with
reviewing valid notifications for removal of illegal hate speech in under twentyfour hours, “remov[ing] or disabl[ing] access to such content, if necessary.” 25 One
major difference between the Network Enforcement Act and this early prototype
is that the removal was based primarily on the companies’ Terms of Service, rather
than substantive criminal law. 26 This is in line with the E.U.’s vision of a “digital
single market,” which extends the idea of a unified Europe to cyberspace. 27
Despite the compliance with the law, one official lamented the fact that Facebook
only reviewed forty percent of reported cases within twenty-four hours. 28 E.U.
Justice Commissioner Vera Jourova, warned that tech companies “will have to act
quickly and make a strong effort in the coming months” if they wanted to show
that a non-legislative approach was viable. 29
21

Id. at 208. While this Comment attributes the Charlie Hebdo attacks to ISIS, they were actually
claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. See Catherine E. Schoichet & Josh Levs, Al Qaeda
Branch Claims Charlie Hebdo Attack was Years in the Making, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://perma.cc/F5BL-4PRK.

22

Brussels is home to the Brussels Privacy Hub, “an academic privacy research centre with a global
focus . . . Brussels is where key decisions are taken on data protection in the European Union, and
EU rules set the standard for data protection and privacy law around the world.” About the Brussels
Privacy Hub, BRUSSELS PRIVACY HUB, http://perma.cc/W9P6-AX89.

23

Council of the E.U. Press Release 158/16, Joint Statement of E.U. Ministers for Justice and Home
Affairs and Representatives of E.U. Institutions on the Terrorist Attacks in Brussels on 22 March
2016 (Mar. 24, 2016), http://perma.cc/L8XJ-V59D.
Liat Clark, Facebook and Twitter Must Tackle Hate Speech or Face New Laws, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2016),
http://perma.cc/YCN7-4AP6.
Id. See also European Commission Factsheet, Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech
Online: First Results on Implementation (Dec. 2016).
Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2018).
See EUR. COMM’N, Priority: Digital Single Market, http://perma.cc/74TV-9684.

24

25

26

27
28
29

Clark, supra note 24.
Id.
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By passing the Network Enforcement Act, Germany showed that it felt
Facebook and other social media companies’ responses since Charlie Hebdo have
been inadequate. They are not alone. 30 Since the Network Enforcement Act’s
passage, Russia (another ECHR signatory), Singapore, and the Philippines have
all cited it as a “positive example.” 31 The U.K. and France have both recently
begun to crack down on speech online. The U.K. recently passed the Digital
Economy Act, which requires pornographic websites to develop the technology
to actively block users under the age of eighteen, something privacy and free
speech experts worry could lead to further censorship. 32 French president
Emmanuel Macron is pushing for a measure which would grant judges emergency
powers to remove or block content determined to be “fake” during “sensitive
election periods.” 33 The E.U. has also recently moved closer to intermediary
responsibility. It floated an agreement to force social media companies to remove
unlawful terroristic content within an hour or face fines. 34

B. What is Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in
sozialen Netzwerken?
1. The Network Enforcement Act is a law designed to combat
extremism and hate speech online.
The Network Enforcement Act is a deceptively simple law. It applies to
“telemedia service providers” or “social networks,” defined as entities with over
two million registered users in Germany “which, for profit-making purposes,
operate internet platforms which are designed to enable users to share any content
with other users or to make such content available to the public.” 35 There are
exceptions for platforms which offer “journalistic or editorial content” and
messaging services. 36 In short, professional networks, specialist portals, games
with online messaging systems, sales platforms, and email are intended to be
30

31

32

33

See generally Giancarlo F. Frosio, Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? From Intermediary Liability to
Responsibility, 26 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 1 (2017).
Germany: Flawed Social Media Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/B87KYGLJ.
Billy Perrigo, The U.K. Is About to Regulate Online Porn, and Free Speech Advocates Are Terrified, TIME
MAGAZINE (Aug. 20, 2018), http://perma.cc/JH4U-LMXY.
James McAuley, France Weighs a Law to Rein in ‘Fake News,’ Raising Fears for Freedom of Speech,
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2018), http://perma.cc/HW79-N7LE. It is important to note that
while distasteful, printing fake news is usually not considered illegal in modern times.

34

Saqib Shah, E.U. Will Fine Social Media Sites for Lingering Extremism, ENGADGET (Sept. 12, 2018),
http://perma.cc/NR2E-RVYJ.

35

Netzwekdurchsetzungsgesetz, supra note 1, at § 1.
Id.

36
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excluded. 37 This leaves the big social media companies, such as Facebook,
Instagram, YouTube, and Google+, in the law’s reach.
The law then outlines these companies’ reporting obligations. Companies
which receive more than a hundred complaints per calendar year about unlawful
content are mandated to produce biannual reports on how they handled said
unlawful content. 38 As of July 2018, this number included Twitter (approximately
270,000 complaints); 39 YouTube (58,297 complaints); 40 Google+ (2,769
complaints); 41 Change.org (1,257 complaints); 42 and Facebook (886 complaints). 43
These reports, which can be found on the individual company websites as well as
the German Federal Gazette, contain a nine-point list of requirements with which
companies must comply, ranging from “general observations outlining the efforts
undertaken by the provider . . . to eliminate criminally punishable activity on the
platform,” 44 to a detailed breakdown of how many complaints they received, from
where those complaints were obtained, and how quickly they were removed. 45
Finally, and most controversially, the law dictates how social media
companies should handle certain kinds of complaints about unlawful content. The
law requires social media companies to address complaints related to eighteen
provisions of the criminal code, 46 enumerated below: 47
1. Dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional
organizations (§ 86)
2. Using symbols of unconstitutional organizations (§ 86(a))
3. Preparation of a serious violent offense endangering the state (§
89(a))

37
38

Engels & Fuhrmann, supra note 3.
Netzwekdurchsetzungsgesetz, supra note 1, at § 2(1).

39

Twitter Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzbericht: Januar–Juni 2018, TWITTER (2018), http://perma.cc/JU7LND3U (Ger.).

40

Removals under the Network Enforcement Law, GOOGLE (2018), http://perma.cc/L8PY-RAQ4.
Removals under the Network Enforcement Law, GOOGLE (2018), http://perma.cc/Z98S-25V5.

41
42

Centre For European Policy Studies, Germany’s NetzDG: A Key Test For Combatting Online
Hate 9 (2018).

43

NetzDG Transparency Report, FACEBOOK (July 2018), http://perma.cc/99SR-E3T9.
Netzwekdurchsetzungsgesetz, supra note 1, at §2(2)(1).

44
45
46
47

Id. at § 2(2)(3).
Id. at § 1(3).
See Michael Bohlander, trans., Criminal Code in the version promulgated on 13 November 1998,
Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] I p. 3322, last amended by Article 1 of the Law of 24
September 2013, Federal Law Gazette I p. 3671 and with the text of Article 6(18) of the Law of 10
October 2013, Federal Law Gazette I p 3799. Bundesgesetzblatt [Criminal Code], Nov. 13, 1998,
BGBL II, last amended by Gesetz [G], Sept. 2013 BGBL II, translation at http://perma.cc/Y6DKFAEQ.
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4. Encouraging the commission of a serious violent offense
endangering the state (§ 91)
5. Treasonous forgery (§ 100(a))
6. Public incitement to crime (§ 111)
7. Breach of the public peace by threatening to commit offenses
(§ 126)
8. Forming criminal or terrorist organizations (§§ 129–129(b))
9. Incitement to hatred (§ 130)
10. Dissemination of depictions of violence (§ 131)
11. Rewarding and approving of offenses (§ 140)
12. Defamation of religions, religious and ideological associations
(§ 166)
13. Insult (§ 185)
14. Defamation (§ 186)
15. Intentional defamation (§ 187)
16. Violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs (§ 201a)
17. Threatening the commission of a felony (§ 241)
18. Forgery of data intended to provide proof (§ 269)
Content which is determined to be “manifestly unlawful,” because it violates
one of the above criminal provisions, must be removed within twenty-four hours,
although a company may work with law enforcement to receive an extension. 48
Content which is merely “unlawful” must be removed or have access blocked
within seven days. 49 There is no guidance about how to determine whether
something is manifestly unlawful under the law other than the related criminal
statutes, 50 so companies must make their own determination or seek the outside
assistance of an attorney.
48
49
50

Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, supra note 1, at § 3.
Id.
The statutes vary in effectiveness and clarity. For example, the definition for “insult” only reads
“An insult shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine and, if the insult
is committed by means of an assault, with imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine.”
Bohlander, supra note 47, at § 185. Whereas the definition of “[b]reach of the public peace by
threatening to commit offences” states, in detail:
(1) Whosoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace, threatens to
commit
1. an offence of rioting indicated in section 125a 2nd sentence Nos 1 to 4;
2. murder under specific aggravating circumstances (section 211), murder
(section 212) or genocide (section 6 of the Code of International Criminal
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If a user’s content is removed, currently the only recourse they have is at the
discretion of the social media company. If the decision depends on the falsity of
a factual allegation or other factual circumstances, the network may give a user an
opportunity to respond. 51 Unfortunately, this is not required, and the law contains
no mandatory recourse for individuals whose content is removed at the initial
“manifestly unlawful” stage. However, as is discussed throughout this Comment,
affected individuals may appeal to the courts.

2. The three initial concerns about the interaction between freedom of
expression and the Network Enforcement Act are censorship,
overblocking, and removal of lawful content
The Network Enforcement Act raises three main concerns with regard to
freedom of expression. First, there is the issue of censorship. Second, there is the
problem of overblocking, which leads to to a chilling effect on speech. Finally,
there is the issue of what “remove” really means and the exportation of censorship
to other countries.
a) Censorship
Politicians from Germany’s far-right party, Alternative for Deutschland
(AfD), are among the law’s staunchest opponents. 52 AfD members argue that the
law permits state-sanctioned censorship based on their beliefs, rather than the
Law) or a crime against humanity (section 7 of the Code of International
Criminal Law) or a war crime (section 8, section 9, section 10, section11 or
section 12 of the Code of International Criminal Law);
3. grievous bodily harm (section 226);
4. an offence against personal freedom under section 232(3), (4), or (5),
section 233(3), each to the extent it involves a felony, section 234, section
234a, section 239a or section 239b;
5. robbery or blackmail with force or threats to life and limb (Sections 249
to 251 or section 255);
6. a felony endangering the public under sections 306 to 306c or section
307(1) to (3), section 308(1) to (3), section 309(1) to (4), section 313, section
314 or section 315(3), section 315b(3), section 316a(1) or (3), section 316c(1)
or (3) or section 318(3) or (4); or
7. a misdemeanour endangering the public under section 309(6), section
311(1), section 316b(1), section 317(1) or section 318(1),
shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.
(2) Whosoever intentionally and knowingly and in a manner capable of
disturbing the public peace pretends that the commission of one of the unlawful
acts named in subsection (1) above is imminent, shall incur the same penalty.
Id. at § 126.
51
52

Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, supra note 1, at § 3(2)(3)(a).
AFD, FACEBOOK (Nov. 21, 2017), http://perma.cc/VM4Q-LFVH. A post where AfD says they
“kept their word” and are requesting the cancellation of the Network Enforcement Act. It includes
a link to a bill to repeal the act.
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content of speech. 53 AfD ran afoul of the law almost immediately. AfD member
Beatrix von Storch tweeted an incendiary response to the Cologne police
department’s New Year message, which was written in Arabic in addition to
German, French, and English. Von Storch accused the department on Twitter of
“appeas[ing] the barbaric, Muslim, rapist hordes of men.” 54 Alice Weidel, the
recently elected lead candidate of AfD, jumped to support her party member. She
tweeted, “our authorities submit to imported, marauding, groping, beating, knifestabbing migrant mobs.” 55 Von Storch’s account was suspended for twelve hours
after her post, 56 while Weidel’s tweet was blocked for German Twitter users. 57
AfD is not alone in its objections to the law. The Left Party and the probusiness Free Democratic Party also have their own concerns about the law. 58
Germany has a difficult history with censorship that the Network Enforcement
Act cannot help but echo. For example, during the Cold War, East Germany’s
feared Ministry for State Security, or Stasi, as well as the Ministry of Culture, had
one of the most robust censorship programs in history. 59 Authors who wished to
write a piece had to work with editors in a publishing house to ensure their
manuscript did not contain any taboo topics prior to receiving authorization to
print. 60 As time went on, it was not only the content of a piece that received
scrutiny but the author’s relationship to the State, as well as their commitment to
socialism. 61 Internal and external reviewers, who could potentially be members of
the State who wished to remove political enemies, potentially parallels the
anonymous reporting of comments and posts online today.
While the Network Enforcement Act is not a prior restraint in the same way
a license is, the similarities are difficult to ignore. The Network Enforcement Act
is another law in a long line of attempts to censor content by proxy. Seth Kreimer
illustrates several examples of proxy censorship through the internet perpetrated
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Linda Kinstler, Germany’s Attempt to Fix Facebook Is Backfiring, THE ATLANTIC (May 18, 2018),
http://perma.cc/9A3P-DDRF.
Philip Oltermann & Pádraig Collins, Two Members of Germany’s Far-Right Party Investigated by State
Prosecutor, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2018), http://perma.cc/R9U9-YC4U.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carol Anee Costabile-Heming, “Rezensur”: A Case Study of Censorship and Programmatic Reception in the
GDR, 92 MONATSHEFTE 53, 54 (2000) (“[GDR’s] structure [went] beyond censorship, a term that
itself was taboo, and bec[ame] a type of systematic control.”).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 58.
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by France, Switzerland, Germany, and Britain. 62 As he explains, “[p]roxy
censorship of the Internet is no passing fad; it is a growth industry of Internet
regulation.” 63
The Council of Europe Commissioner of Human Rights has denounced
such proxy censorship. As early as 2014 it stated “[r]ule of law obligations,
including those flowing from Article[] . . . 10 . . . of the ECHR, may not be
circumvented through ad hoc arrangements with private actors who control the
internet and the wider digital environment.” 64 The Council of Europe also
recommended that “any restrictions on access to internet content affecting users
under [member states’] jurisdiction [should be] based on a strict and predictable
legal framework . . . and afford[] the guarantee of judicial oversight to prevent
possible abuses.” 65 The Network Enforcement Act has no such judicial oversight,
except for when individuals march to the courthouse door on their own. While
Germany is hardly encouraging Facebook to block unlawful content, it also is not
discouraging the practice. The law looks very much like the German legislature is
circumventing its Article 10 obligations by foisting them onto social media
companies. However, the Council of Europe is merely an advisory body 66—
without a binding ruling from the ECtHR, there is little it could do legally to
change Germany’s policy.
b) Overblocking
Less maliciously, there is a concern of overblocking—the blocking of
content which is not actually illegal. While the Bundestag assured companies that
fines would only be levied against systematic actors, there are currently no checks
on social media companies to determine whether the content they are blocking is
actually unlawful. Determining the unlawfulness of content would “ordinarily take
weeks in a German court,” according to Mirko Hohmann, a project manager at
the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin. 67 Rather than allowing the speech to
62

Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 19–20 (2006) (providing examples of:
France attempting to impose liability on Yahoo! for making overseas Nazi messages, images, and
paraphernalia available to French citizens; Swiss police inducing ISPs to block neo-Nazi sites;
German courts requiring ISPs to block access to extraterritorial neo-Nazi websites; British telecom
blocking access to sites on a child pornography blacklist).
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COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNET
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Id. at ¶ 16.
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Values, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2019), http://perma.cc/Q857-ZSA7 (“The Council of Europe
promotes human rights through international conventions. . . It monitors member states' progress
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Kinstler, supra note 53.
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propagate and potentially cause harm while waiting for the courts to adjudicate it,
the Bundestag has decided to shift the cost of court adjudication to its citizens
and tech companies. Now, without the guidance that years of judicial experience
would provide, tech companies are sent out to sea to determine what content is
manifestly unlawful, and citizens whose speech is removed bear the cost of their
silence alone “with none of the due process guarantees that preserve accuracy in
the public sector.” 68 Additionally, because the fines for noncompliance are so
high, private actors have a much greater incentive to protect themselves from
sanctions, as opposed to maintaining the free expression rights of their customers.
Unfortunately, there is no way around this. Speed is among the primary
reasons the law is considered necessary. Once content is placed on the web, it
spreads like wildfire and becomes difficult to remove. The Bundestag was not
thinking of fringe cases of people blowing off steam, or satire. Instead, it was
thinking of imminent threats of violence that need to be removed immediately. 69
However, the chilling effect it could have on speech cannot be denied. Contesting
removal of a post can take weeks, 70 and for the average user it may not be worth
doing.
c) Removal
Finally, the lack of definition for “removal” brings the law into an
international context. What the German Bundestag likely had in mind was that a
post would be taken down for German users. However, Alice Weidel once again
provides an example of why this is far more complicated than it sounds. In May,
a court in Hamburg said that Facebook did not do enough to prevent German
users from viewing a comment on a Huffington Post article about Weidel’s
opposition to gay marriage. 71 The comment referred to Weidel as “Nazi
Drecksau” (filthy Nazi swine) and attacked her sexual orientation (Weidel
identifies as a lesbian). 72 While Facebook immediately blocked the comment from
German IP addresses, Weidel could still see it in Switzerland and other Germanspeaking countries. 73 Therefore, German users within Germany who used an IP
address that makes them appear to be outside of Germany could still view the
68
69

70

Kreimer, supra note 62, at 28.
Maas verteidigt Gesetz gegen Hass im Internet, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 1, 2018), http://perma.cc/67DK7X6K (“Calls for murder, threats and insults, sedition or Auschwitz lie [Holocaust denial] are not
expressions of freedom of expression, but rather are attacks on the freedom of expression of
others.”).
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post. The Hamburg court ruled that because it was viewable in Germany using a
VPN 74 if Facebook did not rectify the issue it could face a fine of up to 250,000
Euros or imprisonment of up to two years. 75
On the face of the law, this is a perfectly acceptable outcome. However, with
respect to international norms, this is unprecedented. Of course, Facebook could
just pay the fine and refuse to remove the content—Facebook’s income for 2018
was 55.8 billion dollars, a figure which even the maximum fine would not
scratch. 76 However, the lack of clarity in the law regarding what it means to
remove a post could lead to other courts following Hamburg’s example. This
would result in the exportation of German criminal law across the globe in a way
that is dangerously overbroad. It also leads to further questions—how should a
company determine a user’s location? Should unlawful content that is visible in
Germany, but originates outside of it, be included? After all, if Weidel’s
commenter had posted from Austria, Switzerland, or another German-speaking
country it is not clear whether the law requires that Facebook still honor her
request to remove the content.
This is not a classroom hypothetical. The Court of Justice of the European
Union recently heard a case on substantially similar grounds related to the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). GDPR is a regulation intended to “protect[]
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right
to the protection of personal data.” 77 Unlike the Network Enforcement Act,
which is nominally German law, GDPR applies extraterritorially to all companies
when processing the data of European consumers. 78 GDPR granted consumers
new data rights, such as the right to data breach notification, right to access and
receive information about data a given company collects on them, as well as the
right to data erasure, or the right to be “forgotten.” 79 A French privacy firm,
CNIL, argued that its clients should be able to be “forgotten” online, as is their
right under GDPR, not only within the boundaries of the E.U. but absolutely and
internationally. CNIL argued that they were only asking for what the E.U. had
74
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A VPN, or Virtual Private Network, allows users to create a secure connection to another network
over the internet. VPNs can be used to access region-restricted websites, so a viewer in Germany
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David Meyer, Facebook’s New Court Defeat: This Time it ‘May Have Free Speech Implications’, ZDNET
(May 1, 2018), http://perma.cc/66DS-SRY2.
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already granted. Google’s lawyers, supported by legal counsel from other tech
companies, pushed back. Not only would the system be “untenable,” but it would
potentially affect access to information and freedom of expression in countries
across the globe. 80
The Network Enforcement Act could lead to even bigger conflicts. Unlike
GDPR’s data erasure provision, where a given consumer is requesting that
information about themselves be removed, the Network Enforcement Act forces
the removal of content that the consumer explicitly does not want to be removed.
This could potentially lead to novel and impossible to solve conflict-of-laws issues.
If an American college student visits a German news site for a class and is moved
to insult the person in the article, the First Amendment and the Network
Enforcement Act could have the ultimate legal showdown, with social media
companies trapped in the middle.

C. The Brussels Effect, and Why the European Court of Human
Rights Should Adjudicate This Law
What happens in Germany and the E.U. on the internet has an outsized
effect on global internet culture. Anu Bradford has coined this phenomenon “The
Brussels Effect” in order to describe the “deeply underestimated aspect of
European power that the discussion on globalization and power politics
overlooks: Europe’s unilateral power to regulate global markets.” 81 The simplest
example of this is privacy. As discussed in Section II(B), depending on how the
European Court of Justice interprets GDPR, the right to be forgotten could
change legal rights for people all over the world.
For social media companies, this influence is often exerted without utilizing
legal channels. For instance, the code of conduct to counteract hate speech
mentioned previously is not binding law. These “voluntary” measures have their
own advantages and disadvantages because they allow “[the circumvention of] the
E.U. charter on restrictions to fundamental rights, avoiding the threat of legal
challenges, and taking a quicker reform route.” 82 Thus, while appearing to be all
stick and no carrot, the Network Enforcement Act at least has the benefit of being
justiciable in open court.
Nevertheless, depending on how courts interpret the law, German criminal
law might easily be moved far outside its borders. Weidel’s case is a good example
of this. A rude comment, such as the one she fought, would likely not have
80

Mark Scott, In Google Privacy Case, Europe’s Highest Court to Decide on Future of the Web, POLITICO (Sept.
12, 2018), http://perma.cc/TU2F-FPZB.
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implicated removal in other portions of Europe. The German criminal code’s
particular sensitivity to references to the Nazi Party, as well as their unusual
Beleidigunggesetz, or law protecting people against insults, goes well beyond standard
defamation law—particularly how U.S.-based tech companies would understand
it. 83 “The decentralized, global nature of the internet means that almost anyone
can present an idea, make an assertion, post a photograph or push to the world
numerous other types of content, some of which may be illegal in some
jurisdictions or offensive in some cultures.” 84 It is the fact that regulations
concerning the internet are so porous that makes it especially important that this
law is adjudicated by an international court, so as to avoid the German legislature
making decisions on behalf of seven billion people, rather than the eighty million
they were elected to represent.

III. T HE E UROPEAN C OURT OF H UMAN R IG HTS AND
A RTIC LE 10
This Section discusses the history of Article 10 of the ECHR, as well as the
history of the ECtHR generally. Because Germany is a signatory country to this
treaty, the ECtHR can have jurisdiction over a case brought to it, provided that
the petitioner exhausts their opportunity for relief within their own country.
Section III(B) explains why Germany’s highest court will likely find that the
Network Enforcement Act is constitutional under Germany’s Basic Law for the
Federal Republic of Germany, which acts as the country’s constitution. The final
section explains how Article 10 cases have been reviewed generally, in order to
provide context for how those rights may apply to the Network Enforcement Act.
It explains that the two principles of necessity and proportionality are key to
examining Article 10 cases.

A. History of Article 10 of the ECHR and the European Court
of Human Rights
The ECHR was opened for signature in Rome in November 1950 and
entered into force three years later. 85 The Convention was a response to the
human rights atrocities committed before and during the European theater of
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Erik Kirschbaum, In Germany It Can be a Crime to Insult Someone in Public, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016),
http://perma.cc/7JTF-45KP.
Frosio, supra note 30, at 2.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE: 50 YEARS
HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (Egbert Myjer et al. eds., 1st ed. 2010).
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WWII, as well as the rise of communism in the Eastern Bloc. 86 The drafters of
the Convention, the Council of Europe, intended to provide an institutional
framework based on liberal democratic values to overcome the extremism of
fascism and to set a counterbalance against a looming threat of Stalinist
communism. 87 The ECHR is only applicable to member states, which currently
includes Germany as well as forty-six other European countries. 88 The ECHR is
enforced by the ECtHR, also referred to as “the Strasbourg Court” due to its
location in Strasbourg, France.
Like most post-war international human rights treaties, the ECHR
establishes a set of enumerated rights. Article 10 instituted freedom of expression
as one of those rights. 89 The landmark case, Handyside v. United Kingdom, 90
established the importance of freedom of expression to the ECtHR. There, the
court stated: “freedom of expression is ‘one of the essential foundations’ of a
democratic society.” 91 Although it is only two paragraphs, Article 10 is
complicated. It articulates multiple freedoms of expression, including the freedom
to express one’s opinion, receive information, and communicate information. 92
Freedom of expression also applies not only to ideas that are “favorably received
or regarded as inoffensive. . . but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.” 93
What constitutes expression is also incredibly broad. Paintings, books, cartoons,
films, video-recordings, statements in radio interviews, and pamphlets are all
included. 94 Most importantly for this Comment’s purposes, the internet is also
considered a valid place of expression. 95
While the historical background of Article 10 provides a mandate of sorts to
the ECtHR to protect freedom of expression, that same history has allowed the
court to curtail freedom of expression that is seen to violate historical norms. This
leads to biased jurisprudence when it comes to freedom of expression claims. The

86

See generally BERNADETTE RAINEY ET AL., JACOBS, WHITE,
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (7th ed. 2017).
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case law has evolved such that there is a presumption in favor of national
authorities where they justify their laws based on “their fight against . . . antiConvention values.” 96 Anything related to the National Socialist Party or the
Holocaust receives stricter scrutiny than other equivalent claims. 97 For example,
while Germany may bar Holocaust denial and similarly anti-Semitic sentiments,
the same prior restraints are not allowed for the Armenian genocide. 98

B. How Article 10 is Applied Generally
The ECtHR follows a four-part test in determining whether an action
violates Article 10. First, the ECtHR must determine whether the state action
actually interferes with free expression. The court has found that a wide variety of
activities, from run-of-the-mill censorship and confiscation to prohibitions on
wearing symbols that communicate resistance, constitute interference with
expression. 99 The important part of this analysis is whether the state is directly
interfering with a person’s expressive rights. Where the impact on speech is
indirect—that is, “collateral to the exercise by the state of its authority for other
purposes”—the ECtHR rarely finds that the matter breaches Article 10. 100
Article 10 explicitly outlines ways in which states may abridge expression. 101
Of course, states abridge expression all the time in ways that are not enumerated
by the ECHR—this Comment has already discussed a few. Article 10(2) explains
that states are free to place formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties on
speech provided they are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society.” 102 Those two conditions provide the next two steps by which the ECtHR
must analyze a freedom of expression claim. The second step, whether something
is “prescribed by law,” is usually the shortest. The “law” in the phrase “prescribed
by law” means that a law must be foreseeable—that is, precise enough to allow
applicants to reasonably predict that their actions would violate the law. 103
Precision does not only include the content of a law but also “the field it is
designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is
96

97

98
99
100
101
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HARRIS ET AL. (3rd ed. 2014), supra note 87, at 616.
ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 10 (states are allowed to license television).
Id.
See generally Open Door Counselling Ltd. v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); Delfi AS v.
Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, 2015-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 319.
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address[ed].” 104 The court gives broad latitude to state legislatures in this step and
rarely spends any time on this issue.
Instead, the bulk of the analysis lies in the third and fourth steps that make
up the necessity test. The ECtHR must determine whether the free speech
limitation is necessary in a democratic society, and, if it is necessary, whether it is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 105 The court has stated: “‘[N]ecessary’,
within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a ‘pressing social
need’.” 106 The court has also stated that “necessary” lies between “indispensable”
and words like “‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’, [and] ‘desirable’.” 107
Article 10(2) outlines nine reasons a state might be allowed to interfere with
speech due to necessity: national security interests; disorder or crime prevention;
territorial integrity or public safety; protection of health or morals; protection of
the reputation or rights of others; prevention of the disclosure of information
received in confidence; or, maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary. 108
Even if necessity is found, an interference can be a violation of Article 10 if
it is not proportionate. Proportionality is the fuzziest portion of this test. It is
unclear who has the burden of proving or disproving proportionality. 109
Furthermore, what constitutes proportionality varies from case to case. The
necessity for a restriction must be “convincingly established” and narrowly
construed to be proportional. 110 Examples of interferences in Articles 8–11, which
have violated the proportionality test include: the firing of a primary school
teacher for being a member of the German communist party; 111 house searches
and seizures without appropriate legislative or judicial safeguards; 112 criminal
sanctions for homosexual activities between consenting men over the age of

104
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twenty-one; 113 as well as the conviction of a journalist who interviewed, and then
reported on, three men who said racist remarks. 114
In order to understand the Court’s approach to proportionality, it is
important to briefly discuss the margin of appreciation doctrine. According to
Professor Yutaka Arai, “the ‘margin of appreciation’ refers to the latitude a
government enjoys in evaluating factual situations and in applying the provisions
enumerated in international human rights treaties.” 115 Because of the importance
of freedom of expression to a democratic society, the court is generally strict when
assessing whether something is “proportional” under Article 10. 116 However, the
content and kind of speech addressed may widen or narrow the margin of
appreciation the court prescribes to states. Like most courts, the ECtHR
acknowledges the fact that expression by the press gets wide protection, 117 as does
political expression which criticizes the government. 118 However, artistic
expression is in a less privileged position in the Court’s eyes. 119 This balancing act
between a state’s needs and desires and the motivations of the ECtHR can make
Article 10 claims particularly difficult to decide.
Outside of this test, Article 10 claims must also be analyzed in the context
of other rights within the ECHR. This is mandated by Article 17, the prohibition
on the abuse of rights. That provision states:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein, or at
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the convention. 120

In light of the historical context for the adoption of the ECHR, the ECtHR
and Europe, in general, are “s[k]eptical of the ability of the democracy to resist
the danger of racist propaganda leading to totalitarian dictatorships and massive
abuses.” 121 As such, Article 10 is not applicable where Article 17 applies. 122 This is
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why German laws that ban speech denying the Holocaust and other forms of
odious speech can be excluded from the scope of Article 10. 123
Similarly, individual instances of speech may implicate other aspects of the
ECHR. For example, defamation claims can be found to interfere with a person’s
Article 8 rights. Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to “respect for private
and family life, home, and correspondence.” 124 Courts have found that an
individual’s reputation is included in their Article 8 rights. 125 Naturally, there are
instances where one person’s freedom of expression will conflict with another’s
right to personal integrity. Likewise, Article 9—freedom of religion 126—and
Article 10 will occasionally interact. Where this occurs, the court performs a
balancing test between the rights as a part of the proportionality test.

C. Bringing a Network Enforcement Act Claim to the ECtHR
Only individuals, groups of individuals, and other member states may bring
claims to the ECtHR. 127 Inter-state claims are relatively rare, with individual
grievances making up the bulk of the court’s 50,000 cases. 128 The ECtHR is a court
of last resort. Before a claim may make its way to Strasbourg, France, it must first
go through the entirety of the judicial system within the claimant’s country. 129 As
such, either an affected social media company or someone from within Germany
will need to first raise a constitutional claim at the German Supreme Court to gain
access to the ECtHR.
Article 5 of the Basic Law of the Federal Government of Germany is the
German constitutional provision which governs freedom of expression. It merely
states: “[e]very person shall have the right to freely express and disseminate his
opinion in speech, writing and picture . . . There shall be no censorship.” 130 The
following section provides that “[t]hese rights shall find their limits in the
provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and
in the right to personal honor.” 131
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Operating under the assumption that every individual law the Network
Enforcement Act is supposed to enforce has been found constitutional in
Germany, recent scholarship suggests that the Act will also be found
constitutional. 132 It is not censorship in the traditional sense because the state is
not the one affecting content, and the content is being taken down postpublication, as opposed to a prepublication licensing scheme. 133 Further,
overzealous enforcement by individual private actors is arguably not covered
under a constitutional provision that is intended to monitor governmental actions.
For example, Germany has long been known to require video game companies to
censor Nazi symbols in their games in order to receive a license to sell the game. 134
Since 1998, when the Wolfenstein 3D case, 135 which solidified this policy, was
decided, and until very recently video game manufacturers would remove Hitler’s
mustache, replace or block swastikas, or not release games in Germany at all in
order to comply with the practice. 136 This censorship, which ended officially in
August 2018, 137 never ended up in court after Wolfenstein 3D. Therefore, the
premise of the law is still good. Germany can still force companies to comply with
a law that violates freedom of art and arguably a consumer’s freedom to receive
information. In fact, in the Network Enforcement Act’s case, the argument is even
stronger because the statements are neither in a historical nor fantastical context—
these are statements made by real people with real harms that the government
seeks to prevent.
Additionally, none of the problems that the Network Enforcement Act
arguably creates are new to social media companies nor unique to law. Companies
have always had the ability to regulate speech according to their own terms of
service. Neither the Council of Europe’s anti-hate speech code nor the Network
Enforcement Act changed the fact that the final step of review lies with the courts.
Although the Network Enforcement Act acknowledges this fact wholeheartedly
and moves even further towards private regulation, it is not clear that the Act itself
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is the problem. 138 There are examples globally of social media companies blocking
accounts and removing legal content because it violates their personal terms of
service. The fact that they are not doing so at the behest of the government
arguably does not make this any more or less problematic.
Once the Network Enforcement Act is found constitutional within
Germany, the ECHR is implicated. Article 1 states: “The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in Section I of this Convention.” 139 The ECtHR has found that there is a positive
obligation to ensure freedom to receive information in certain contexts. 140 The
court has also found that among the positive obligations a contracting party has
is providing a legal framework that protects expression. 141 Given that the Network
Enforcement Act is a German law, the court would have jurisdiction to hear it,
despite the fact that private actors are making the final decisions.

IV. T HE N ETWORK E NFORCEMENT A CT AND THE E UROPEAN
C OURT OF H UMAN R IGHTS
This section analyzes whether the Network Enforcement Act is permissible
under Article 10 of the ECHR by walking through the ECtHR’s four-part test.
Sections IV(B) and IV(C) argue that, for some of the criminal provisions, the law
is neither necessary nor proportional to the needs Germany expressed a desire to
protect when the law passed. For comparatively minor comments, which do not
express imminent threats or acts of violence, the lack of due process afforded to
those who have their comments removed is not proportional to the fines that
social media companies may face for hosting those comments. Additionally,
because social media companies already enforce their own terms of service as
private platforms, it is not necessary for comments which fall under less severe
categories. As such, these provisions of the law should be found to violate Article
10 of the ECHR.
However, this is a much closer issue than it might initially seem and
highlights some of the problems the ECtHR will have to deal with when it comes
to regulating social media companies in the future. As long as undesirable content
is posted online, social media companies and global leaders will need to work
together to keep the internet safe for everyone, while still providing a unified
network.

138
139
140
141

Wischmeyer, supra note 132, at 16.
ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 1.
RAINEY ET. AL., supra note 86, at 515.
Id.
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A. Important Precedent and Case Law
When examining the legality of the Network Enforcement Act, there are a
few cases and terms that will be used extensively. Therefore, it is important to
outline them at the forefront of the argument. While, as Section III(C) discussed,
the court has a robust history of dealing with Article 10 claims generally, the
internet and intermediaries have illuminated some of the weaknesses in that
procedure. Most modern communication takes place over networks owned by
private companies, which the court acknowledges “provides an unprecedented
platform for the exercise of freedom of expression.” 142 However, the court’s
Article 10 jurisprudence to date has addressed the historical fears of direct
government censorship, and individual liability for infringing content. These fears
have in some ways been overtaken by “censorship-by-proxy” fears, 143 which have
not yet been extensively addressed.
As such, the court is in the process of developing new methodology when it
comes to these internet intermediary liability cases. According to Robert Spano, a
judge on the ECtHR, the court appears to be trying to strike a balance between
two competing viewpoints. The first is net neutrality, described generally as the
proposition that internet service providers should treat all traffic equally,
regardless of origin. 144 The second is the viewpoint promoted by the European
Commission: “what is illegal offline is also illegal online.” 145 To date, the court has
not staked out a full position on the role of intermediaries in general
circumstances. However, their analysis with respect to certain kinds of claims is
useful for predicting how the court would address a Network Enforcement Act
claim.
One of the first cases to help establish the contours of this emerging
methodology is Delfi v. Estonia. 146 Delfi is a landmark case, where the court for the
first time laid out a framework for dealing with internet intermediaries in the
context of news sites and Article 10. Delfi is an internet news portal that publishes
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Intermediary Liability, THE CENTER
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up to 330 news articles per day in Estonian and Russian. 147 It is historically one of
the most visited websites in Estonia and Lithuania. 148 Like most modern online
news sites, Delfi had a comment box at the bottom of its articles. 149 The articles
received about 10,000 comments per day, which were monitored through reader
complaints and submissions, as well as an algorithm which automatically removed
comments that contained obscene words. 150 Delfi published an article about a
ferry company, which implicated the company’s majority shareholder (referred to
only as L) in a plan to destroy an ice road. 151 This article generated 185 comments,
of which twenty were personal threats or attacks directed to L. 152 L sued Delfi to
force them to remove the comments, as well as for 32,000 Euros in non-pecuniary
damages. 153 Delfi removed the comments, six weeks after they had been posted,
but protested the damages. 154 The court held that Delfi was the discloser of the
defamatory comments, and therefore they could be sued for defamation. 155 It also
found that there was a legitimate interest in protecting the rights of others under
Article 10, and that the fine was necessary and proportionate to protect that
interest. 156
A Network Enforcement Act claim would not simply be a repeat of Delfi.
First, the Network Enforcement Act explicitly excludes news sites. 157 Conversely,
as Delfi was a case of first impression for intermediary liability in this sphere, the
court chose to narrow its ruling to the kind of company and the kind of speech at
issue (a news site, and defamation, respectively). 158 The court explicitly refused to
make judgments on the liability of social media platforms. 159 However, the court
did establish the proposition that “certain intermediaries should play an active role
in minimizing the spread of particularly harmful content.” 160 A Network
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GEMIUS RATING, Domains, http://perma.cc/4MSC-XHEZ.
Delfi v. Estonia, supra note 103, at ¶ 12.
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Id. at ¶ 13.
Id. at ¶ 16.
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Id. at ¶ 18.
Id. at ¶ 19.
Delfi AS v. Estonia, COLUMBIA GLOBAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, http://perma.cc/5BPM-K6NG.
See generally id.; Spano, supra note 144, at 669-72; Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 103.
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsdesetz, supra note 1, at § 1(1).
Spano, supra note 144, at 670.
Delfi v. Estonia, supra note 103, at ¶ 116.
Lisl Brunner, The Liability of an Online Intermediary for Third Party Content - The Watchdog Becomes the
Monitor: Intermediary Liability after Delfi v. Estonia, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163, 173 (2016).

Summer 2019

277

Chicago Journal of International Law

Enforcement Act claim would force the court to address the tenuous issues left
out of Delfi and establish exactly which intermediaries need to play an active role.
Second, Delfi concerned a series of comments, rather than an overarching
notice and takedown regime like the one the Network Enforcement Act
promotes. Nevertheless, the general scenario is very similar. In both cases, an
intermediary, who does not have control over the content posted, is requested to
remove unlawful content and faced with a fine for not doing so in a timely manner.
The intermediary in Delfi was also a big name—Delfi is prominent in Estonia, 161
and the kinds of social media providers who the Network Enforcement Act
targets are also likely to be prominent, based on their size. 162 This is in contrast to
cases such as Pihl v. Sweden, 163 in which the insignificance of the website led the
court to believe that the Article 8 harms the applicant suffered were outweighed
by the chilling effect that third-party liability for the anonymous comments would
have. 164
A similar, but contrary, intermediary liability case is Magyar
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu v. Hungary. 165 Once again, the Court
addressed an intermediary’s liability for comments on a news site. Magyar
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete (MTE) is the self-regulatory body of Hungarian
internet content providers, while Index is the owner of a major news portal in
Hungary. 166 In this case, the site posted an article arguing that the business
practices of two real estate management companies were unethical. 167 These
included comments such as “[p]eople like this should go and shit a hedgehog and
spend all their money on their mothers’ tombs until they drop dead.” (“Azért az
ilyenek szarjanak sünt és költsék az összes bevételüket anyjuk sírjára, amíg meg
nem dögölnek.”)168 Here, however, the comments were not found to be illegal,
and therefore liability would be improper. 169 As the court described it, “Although
offensive and vulgar . . . the incriminated comments did not constitute clearly
161
162

163

See GEMIUS RATING, supra note 148.
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unlawful speech; and they certainly did not amount to hate speech or incitement
to violence.” 170 They also found that because the domestic courts failed to address
the liability of the commenters in addition to the liability of the website, the
website could not be held liable. 171
Magyar is important because it acknowledges that having a law that holds a
“large Internet news portal” liable for third-party commenters is enough to meet
the “prescribed by law” portion of the Article 10 analysis. 172 Additionally, by
implementing fines for those comments, the state was clearly interfering with
MTE and Index’s freedom of expression. 173 This simplifies the Network
Enforcement Act claim analysis considerably.
The final applicable case is Tamiz v. United Kingdom, 174 which was decided in
late 2017. A short piece about Mr. Tamiz, alongside a photograph of him, was
uploaded to a Blogger-hosted website “London Muslim.” 175 Mr. Tamiz used the
“report abuse” feature in late April to complain that the comments were
defamatory. 176 In July, after clarification that the comments were false as well as
defamatory, Google refused to remove the post or comments itself but did
forward the complaints to the blog’s author, who subsequently removed the
comments and the post. 177 There, the court held that the domestic courts had
adequately balanced an anonymous Google Blogger commenter’s Article 10 rights
with the applicant’s Article 8 rights.
The court distinguished the case from Delfi by pointing out that here the
Court was finally dealing with a social media platform “where the platform
provider[] does not offer any content and where the content provider may be a
private person running a website or blog as a hobby.” 178 The court also pointed
out that wide latitude in a case like this was important because platform providers,
such as Google here, perform an important role in “facilitating access to
information and debate on a wide range of political, social, and cultural topics.” 179
Importantly, although this case was about individual comments rather than
procedure generally, this is the first case that the court decided about a social
media company.

170
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Magyar Tartalomszolàltatòk Egyesülete and Index.hu v. Hungary , supra note 165, at para. 64.
Id.
Id. at para. 51.
Spano, supra note 144, at 673.
Tamiz v. United Kingdom, App. no. 3877/14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2017).
Id. at para. 7.
Id. at para. 17
Id. at para. 18-21.
Id. at para. 85 (citing Delfi v. Estonia, supra note 103, at ¶ 115-116).
Id. at para. 90.
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B. The Network Enforcement Act is an Interference with
Expression Prescribed by Law
The threshold questions of the ECtHR’s freedom of expression analysis—
whether a state action is an interference with expression and whether that
interference was prescribed by law—are relatively simple to answer in light of the
aforementioned case law. The Network Enforcement Act was a widely publicized
law, passed by the national legislature, therefore it is certainly foreseeable enough
to be “prescribed by law.” As far as interference goes, the ECtHR in Delfi, Pihl,
and Tamiz frequently referred to the Article 10 rights of providers as a given. That
the social media companies who are tasked with removing comments have Article
10 rights has not been the subject of in-depth analysis by the court, but it is
something that they recognize. For example, in Tamiz, the court consistently refers
not only to the Article 10 rights of readers but also of Google and information
society service providers (“ISSPs”). 180 Since we are in the context of removing
content at the direction of the state, with sanctions for noncompliance, it is clear
that there is an interference with their rights.

C. Is Interference through NetzDG Necessary?
Given the nature of policy developments regarding the internet, while
intermediary liability is not required by the ECHR, it does not go against the treaty.
Therefore, the ECtHR will likely find that Germany’s interference with freedom
of expression through the Network Enforcement Act is necessary for many of the
eighteen criminal provisions companies are asked to enforce. For example, the
Act falls within the sweet spot of “desirable” and “indispensable” that the court
described in Sunday Times 181 for dissemination of depictions of violence, public
incitement to crime, and preparation of a serious violent offense endangering the
state. Yet for other provisions, such as incitement to hatred, insult, or defamation,
the line between desirable and necessary is much more permeable. There, because
the harm is less, and because affected individuals may still go after the original
commenters, liability for these companies is arguably not necessary.
It has never been a question that the internet, and by extension social media,
needs to be regulated. The problem that courts have grappled with for the better
part of two decades is how. If social media is like the press, then the ECtHR will
more closely examine the necessity of regulations which restrict it. The ECtHR
has emphasized on numerous occasions that the press is the “public watchdog in

180
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Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, supra note 107, at para. 59

280

Vol. 20 No. 1

Enforcement Through the Network

McMillan

a democratic society.” 182 However, as the court has recently encountered in cases
like Delfi, the internet’s speed and reach means that there is an increased likelihood
that unchecked speech can infringe on other people’s rights, such as their rights
under Article 8. 183 Additionally, due to the potentially anonymous nature of
comments, there may be limited means for an affected individual to respond to
attacks on their reputation or private life. As such, there is a greater impulse to
place pressure on “points of control” such as Facebook and Twitter in order to
curb undesirable content. 184 There is growing support for the idea that social
media companies should be seen as “gatekeepers” to information. Therefore, as
gatekeepers, they “must assume an obligation as trustees of the greater good.” 185
The ECtHR has stated that due to the important role that ISSPs play in
facilitating access to information and public debate, the state has a wide margin of
appreciation in cases similar to Tamiz. 186 Even without that, Germany has strong
arguments that the Network Enforcement Act is necessary for the interests of
national security, public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, and for the
protection of the reputation or the rights of others. All of these are valid reasons
to restrict speech under Article 10. 187 The Network Enforcement Act requests that
social media providers remove only content which has already been determined
to be unlawful within one day to one week. This request that social media
companies remove content that is arguably unprotected under Article 10 188 seems
reasonable.
Heiko Maas, Germany’s Federal Minister of Justice and Consumer
Protection, described NetzDG as promoting, rather than chilling, freedom of
expression because it removes violent and unlawful content online. 189 Arguably,
without something like the Network Enforcement Act, countries are creating a

182

RAINEY ET. AL., supra note 86, at 496.

183

See id. at 487; ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 8 (outlining the right to respect for private and family life).
See, generally Tamiz v. United Kingdom, supra note 174, at para. 75 (noting that while many user
comments are likely defamatory, the majority of comments are likely to be too trivial or limited in
publication to cause any significant damages to a person’s reputation.); See also Kreimer, supra note
62, at 17.
Frosio, supra note 30, at 7 (citing ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE
INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 225
(2000)).

184

185

186
187
188

189

Tamiz v. United Kingdom, supra note 174, at para. 90.
ECHR, supra note 9, at art. 10(2)
Delfi v. Estonia, supra note 103, at para. 136 (“Moreover, the Court has held that speech that is
incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention is not protected by
Article 10 by virtue of Article 17 of the Convention.”).
Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 10.

Summer 2019

281

Chicago Journal of International Law

tiered system—speech which is okay online is “verboten” (forbidden) offline. 190
Additionally, Maas notes, speech which incites violence or abuses others has its
own chilling effect. 191 This is a powerful argument. In 2016, a survey of German
daily newspapers found that over half of the editorial teams did not allow
comments on their own websites or on Facebook, in part due to how difficult it
is to moderate right-wing and radical content. 192 As was described previously,
none of the German provisions which social media companies have been tasked
with enforcing has been declared to be in violation of any treaty or constitution.
Therefore, the content which is correctly removed is arguably not violating
anyone’s expression.
Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that the Network Enforcement Act
is not necessary for the more nuanced criminal provisions like defamation or
insult. In those circumstances, the law certainly is not indispensable. Even
assuming that, as the court presumed in Delfi, there is a tendency for platform
providers to drag their feet when it comes to the removal of content, whether that
is due to lack of knowledge, manpower, or actual bad faith varies from instance
to instance. One reading of the Delfi judgment is that the fine was necessary to
deter a notoriously bad actor from failing to remove content. After all, Delfi took
six weeks and a lawsuit to remove the twenty comments against the applicant. 193
The companies affected by the Network Enforcement Act do not seem to have
this issue. For example, Twitter, the company which received by far the most user
(Nutzern) and trusted reporter (Beschwerdestellen) complaints in the first reports, only
removed ten percent of those complaints. 194 The number seems large, but in the
context of the sheer amount of content posted to the site 195 it is a drop in the
bucket. In addition, the companies the law affects have already signed the Code
of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online as discussed in Section
II(A). There is therefore already an international framework that the Network
Enforcement Act duplicates and narrows. Between a company’s own terms of
service and other international agreements, the Network Enforcement Act’s fines
merely provide another stick where one is not necessary.
190
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LIVE STATS, http://perma.cc/AAY7-6MKH. That means it would take fewer than 5 seconds to
reach the amount of content removed over those six months, and 45 seconds to reach the number
of complaints lodged.

282

Vol. 20 No. 1

Enforcement Through the Network

McMillan

Moreover, the law might introduce further confusion. In the case of Twitter,
Facebook, and Google, content subject to complaints was first screened using the
company’s own terms of service, which allows for the removal of legal and illegal
content. 196 Whether companies are able internally screen content has come under
scrutiny after the law’s passage. In April 2018, a court in Berlin told Facebook that
it could not block a user and delete their anti-immigrant comment because
although it may have violated Facebook’s community standards, it did not violate
Germany’s hate speech laws. 197 Yet, in late August 2018, a court in Munich ruled
that Facebook may regulate speech on its own terms because freedom of
expression exists only between citizen and state. However, the court also echoed
Jürgen Habermas’s idea of the “public sphere” 198 by commenting that Facebook
must keep freedom of expression in mind because it is a “public marketplace for
information and exchange of views (öffentlichen Marktplatz für Informationen
und Meinungsaustausch)” despite the fact that it is a private company. 199
This highlights the Left Party’s initial hesitation with the Network
Enforcement Act. In response to Heiko Maas’s impassioned speech about
promoting freedom of expression, a party member stated “[d]as ist keine
Durchsetzung gegenüber den Netzwerken, sondern durch die Netzwerke”—“The Network
Enforcement Act is not enforced against the networks but through the
networks.” 200 The Network Enforcement Act does not penalize companies for
not removing content that was found in court to be unlawful. Instead, it asks social
media companies to become the court and to enforce German law, in some cases
as a substitute to their own terms of service. In a sense, the court in Berlin was
acting as an appellate court to the court of Facebook, and in so doing overturned
their institutional sovereignty.
This is a new direction for intermediaries, and the desirability of said
direction is up for debate. Historically, anti-censorship laws and their enforcement
have only applied to state actors. As Judge Spano points out, “Article 10 of the
convention does not . . . mandate any particular form of intermediary liability.” 201
Therefore, it is not apparent that Facebook must be held liable for third-party
196
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content, or that it has any responsibility to monitor its content at all. As discussed
previously, norms appear to be moving in that direction, but legally, the Network
Enforcement Act is not desirable precisely because social media companies are
private entities. As an example, all of the companies who were required to write
transparency reports removed more content because it violated their own
community standards rather than because it violated German law. 202
However, if not social media companies, it is unclear who could handle these
complaints. The traditional justice system seems currently unable to deal with the
sheer mass and speed of the dissemination of unlawful content on the internet in
a timely manner. Thus, there are few alternatives to social media providers
defining and enforcing the ground rules for online speech through private
community standards. 203 After all, these companies are the ones who may most
quickly and effectively remove content on their platforms.
Therefore, while the ECtHR could find that the Network Enforcement Act
is necessary in its entirety, the best approach that the court could take is to find
the law necessary for some of the eighteen criminal provisions, but not for others.
For example, encouraging the commission of a serious violent offense
endangering the state, as well as public incitement to crime, have imminence that
surrounds their offenses such that real harm could come from allowing the
content to remain online. Therefore, fines and criminal sanctions levied against a
negligent intermediary may seem necessary to induce a speedy takedown of that
content. Conversely, with crimes like “insult” it is not clear that the law is doing
anything more than what a company’s own terms of service are doing.
Additionally, as all of the court cases discussed have shown, whether something
is insulting or defamatory to an individual is hard enough to determine. Whether
it is insulting or defamatory enough to fine an intermediary is another question
altogether. In those cases, without the immediate harm, it may be enough for
Germany to do what it already has the ability to do—retrieve the information
about the perpetrator and go after them through the normal court system. 204 Here,
the duplicative nature and alternative method of dispute resolution mean that the
law borders on merely desirable—not enough to warrant a finding of necessity.

D. Is the Interference Proportional?
There is no one standard for determining the proportionality of a law. As
discussed in Section III(B), the ECtHR requires laws to be convincingly
established and narrowly construed in order to be proportional. This analysis takes
202
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into consideration the kind of speech affected and the state’s margin of
appreciation. Following these guidelines, there is a strong argument that the
Network Enforcement Act is not proportional for most of the eighteen criminal
provisions it covers. Because the harm inflicted by most of the affected content is
not comparable to the potential chilling effect that fines and government
intervention have on speech, there is an imbalance between “the interests served
by the measure and the interests that are harmed by introducing it.” 205 There are
three reasons for this imbalance. First, there is no due process or transparency for
those whose speech is targeted. Second, there is no legal check on the legislature
with regard to whom they fine. Finally, although the court rarely applies a least
restrictive means analysis, it should do so here. It would find that this is not the
least restrictive means of achieving Germany’s goals for most of the criminal
provisions in place, and therefore that the Network Enforcement Act is not
proportional with respect to those provisions.
Before addressing the reasons the law is not proportional, it is important to
note one reason which does not come into play—extraterritorial removal. The
court has previously found that, following the margin of appreciation, states have
the ability to choose the measures by which they deal with issues of obscenity. 206
Therefore, in Perrin v. UK 207 the court declined to review the conviction of an
individual who ran a website which displayed pornographic images on a preview
page, despite the fact that the images were legal both in the U.S., where the
company was based, and other states in Europe. As such, there is no reason to
believe that the court would be persuaded by the argument that the Network
Enforcement Act would violate the Article 10 rights of citizens of other states,
either because they posted in German or because they have a right to access the
contested information.
Currently, the law has no guarantee of due process rights. Tech companies
are not required to allow people to explain their comments or content before
removing them. Such a requirement is something which the European
Commission has recommended. 208 There is no official channel, other than the
court system, for undoing tech companies’ conduct. Even if one were to go
205
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through the courts, there is no requirement that the social media company keep a
record of what it removed. 209 Therefore, the one piece of evidence a user has to
vindicate their response may not be available. Whether this actually has a chilling
effect on speech needs further study. Nevertheless, it is certainly a troubling aspect
of the law, especially considering the fact that the law, unlike a judicial opinion,
does not require companies to explain why they removed particular content. 210
This hardly balances the interests concerned with the free expression rights of
individuals.
Likewise, companies cannot explain why a given piece of content was
reported in the first place. This creates an environment conducive to
discrimination. This is particularly true with regard to the categories, such as
“insult,” that are more open to interpretation. It would not be hard to imagine a
scenario where potentially insulting comments are written, but only those relating
to or posted by certain political parties or ethnic groups are targeted for reporting.
There is a reason that many of the comments behind the challenged cases this
Comment has discussed are authored by AfD members, beyond the party’s antiimmigrant sentiment and Neo-Nazi ties. 211 AfD has been testing the limits of the
law and using it to amplify its voice and message since the law has been passed. 212
The law could be weaponized by political parties to remove comments which
target them at a disproportionate rate to other parties. Unlike the first example of
the law’s lack of transparency, this issue has no fix—it is nearly impossible to get
data on what is not reported. Unless German law evolves to develop a
disproportionate impact claim for free expression online, there is no way to
guarantee an individual’s due process rights in this regard.
The implications of this are particularly worrisome when it comes to
administrative agencies. While the reports state whether the complaints came
from governmental entities or users, there is nothing to stop government agencies
from tracking individuals and reporting their content, regardless of whether they
are in an “unconstitutional organization” or not. When Facebook or Twitter then
refuses to remove it, the companies could be fined. Although it is unlikely to
happen, the fraught history the West has with authoritarianism means that the
court should find this argument persuasive.
The lack of transparency when it comes to fines is another issue in its own
right. Although Heiko Maas emphasized the fact that fines of any size will only be
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levied on “systematic” actors, 213 the text of the law does not include that
guarantee. An additional reason a check on power is necessary is so that fines are
not limited to one provider. There is nothing to stop the legislature from targeting
one or two companies as opposed to all companies in violation of the law. The
fact that the law is colloquially referred to as “the Facebook Law” does not assuage
this concern. 214 Without this particular safeguard, the law as applied to certain
companies could be disproportionate to the rights that the government seeks to
protect. This is an argument which needs to develop with time—to date, no
company has faced fines from the law.
To the second point, placing a burden this heavy on tech companies is
disproportionate to the harm caused by these posts. As Google’s lawyers in Tamiz
v. United Kingdom argued,
[H]olding ISSPs liable from the moment the first letter of complaint was
received, without allowing a reasonable period of time to investigate the
merits of a complaint, to contact the author of the blog or comment, and take
the necessary technical and practical steps to facilitate removal, would [] result
in a disproportionate interference with the ISSP’s Article 10 rights. In order
to strike a fair balance between the interests of the aggrieved person and the
provider of the blogging platform, an ISSP must be afforded a reasonable
period of time to investigate and evaluate a request to remove a comment
and, where appropriate, to implement removal. To find otherwise would
effectively compel ISSPs to remove comments immediately following a
complaint, without first considering its merits, and this would likely stifle
legitimate speech and suppress the publication of information on important
matters of public interest. 215

Although the court did not directly address the proportionality of the
response, Google’s point still stands. The Network Enforcement Act is not
proportionate because it provides every incentive to over-police content with no
oversight, and no equivalent incentive to ensure that lawful content is not deleted.
There is no case of the Court finding disproportionality on these grounds because
the recent cases like Tamiz and Delfi have not addressed the issue. Nevertheless,
the argument is persuasive. Unlike individuals posting, governments assume that
companies are rational actors who will do the bare minimum to maintain the
culture of their platforms and avoid legal costs. This is the way that fines are
expected to work—by increasing the cost of unlawful behavior, such that it is no
longer in a company’s best interest to behave in that way. 216 Although no evidence
of over-blocking has yet been found, there is a real concern that it may occur.
When it does occur, it is unclear that it will be detectable or enforceable. In order
to demonstrate over-blocking, users will have to go to the courts or the press to
213
214
215
216
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show that their content was improperly removed. Without the possibility of some
individual benefit, users are unlikely to do so.
Finally, the Network Enforcement Act is not the least restrictive means by
which Germany can target the harm caused by this content. There are rare
examples where the court has found that the benefits a law provides are
outweighed by the harms it causes under a least restrictive means analysis. 217 The
Network Enforcement Act provides an example of why such an analysis should
be applied to intermediary liability cases. Here, social media companies are
ostensibly being sanctioned for their omissions. However, in practice, they are
indirectly being used to sanction the true wrongful agents—the people who post
unlawful content. In Tamiz and in Delfi, the ECtHR examined alternatives to suing
the intermediary before determining whether the action was valid or not. Part of
the reason the ECtHR decided Tamiz the way it did was because the applicant
could have found the actual commenters and sued them or sued the individual
who placed the article on Blogspot, before suing Google. 218 Tamiz was not a case
“in which no measures were in place to enable the applicant to protect this Article
8 rights.” 219
The Network Enforcement Act, by design, creates circumstances where no
measures are in place to enable applicants to protect their Article 10 rights. In
many ways, it prioritizes the Article 8 rights of the complainers over the Article
10 rights of the commenters. As the divided lower court decisions discussed earlier
show, there is a chance that social media companies could get their decisions
wrong. With no formal mechanism other than the courts to help individuals
adjudicate their rights, chilling of speech is inevitable.
On balance, it is arguable that the court should find in favor of the Network
Enforcement Act for content which incites violence or promotes terrorism. But
for all other content, no matter how insulting or demeaning, it is not proportional.
By drawing this line, the court could help clarify its own jurisprudence and strike
the balance that it desires. Rather than helping facilitate obstacles to a unified
internet and encouraging a fragmented digital economy, the court could find that
although some content is internationally undesirable, the harm to the free
expression rights of intermediaries outweighs the harm to individuals for other
content. This would pave the way for international cooperation on goals relating
to regulations for the internet—something which, as a policy matter outside the
scope of this Comment, is desirable.
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V. C ONCLUSION
The Network Enforcement Act suffers from the issues all laws passed with
short notice and out of fear suffer from: it is vague, overbroad, and pins the moral
blame for very real issues on the wrong individuals. By laying the blame at the feet
of social media intermediaries rather than at the actual perpetrators of hate speech
and violent actions, it effectively shoots the messenger. The ECtHR should find
that this law violates Article 10 for all criminal provisions other than those which
implicate imminent violence or threats to government agencies. Even then, the
law is arguably not necessary because of the fact that the European Union is
working towards its own version of regulating speech and conduct online, on top
of regulations that already exist. Still, at least with regard to the worst conduct, the
fines that companies could potentially receive for not monitoring their content are
more proportional to the harms which they seek to prevent.
This is not to say that the impetus behind the law is misguided—social media
companies do need to be regulated. We are beyond the times where such
companies could be viewed as paper and pens that radical and violent individuals
use to write posters. Instead, they look more and more like billboards on the side
of the highway who choose to sell their space and turn a blind eye to the
consequences of who posts. Also, speed matters when regulating the internet. 220
Mobilizing thousands of people with nothing more than a computer is the reality
of our society today. Fighting the people who would use the internet to support
their ill will is as difficult as fighting the mythic Hydra. If governments are
Hercules, social media companies are Iolaus. 221 While governments are free to cut
off all the heads they please, without social media companies to cauterize the
wounds, the problems of hate speech and extremism will remain unsolvable.
This leads to the most important question, which is far outside the bounds
of this Comment: the question of what the scope of social media regulation should
be. The Network Enforcement Act is a proxy war in the ultimate battle over how
to tame the internet. Companies censor legal content outside the scope of the
Network Enforcement Act all the time. For example, Facebook’s algorithms
blocked and removed posts with variations on the phrase “men are scum,” 222 a
220
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phrase which might violate their community guidelines but would be difficult to
find illegal in most Western jurisdictions. In the first quarter of 2018, YouTube
deleted nearly 9.8 million videos, many of which were flagged before anyone could
view them. 223 At the same time, there is evidence to suggest that companies are
still not doing enough to curb extremist speech on their platforms. If companies
actively monitor content, they move further away from being the passive
platforms most safe-harbor exceptions require. If companies ignore extremist and
violent content, they become complicit in harassment at best or terrorism at worst.
The Network Enforcement Act does not cause nor solve any of these issues.
What Germany’s law does show is the problems with regulating the internet
on a nation-by-nation basis. Social media combines all of the trickiest portions of
free expression jurisprudence and forces it across borders. If courts hold that
content must be globally removed, it will be impossible to uphold the Network
Enforcement Act and respect the margin of appreciation other states have for
monitoring content within their borders. As such the ECtHR will be hard pressed
to find that any domestic law like the Network Enforcement Act is necessary or
proportional as Article 10 requires. Such laws need to be propagated by large,
international bodies such as the E.U. or the U.N. in order to ensure a plurality of
countries agree upon what content needs to be regulated when.
Given the variety of free expression regimes across borders, the best solution
is to focus on the content when there is an international consensus on its
egregiousness and unlawfulness. For example, the E.U. has already decided that
“propaganda that prepares, incites or glorifies acts of terrorism” should be
removed from the internet. 224 Categories of speech like this, which are more
clearly defined and at the core of undesirable online content, can avoid the
controversy and balancing that other categories of speech, such as defamation,
invite. They are also the categories of speech for which speed is of the utmost
importance, and therefore where intermediary liability is an adequate deterrent.
Narrowing the Network Enforcement Act to those categories would help
Germany curb undesirable content online while giving Europe and the world a
chance to create a single digital environment. Finding otherwise could lead to the
end of the unified internet as we know it.
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